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THE PRUDENT PERSON RULE FOR TRUSTEE
INVESTMENT AND MODERN PORTFOLIO
THEORY
PAUL G. HASKELL*
The traditional prudent person rule upheld the objectives of the
family trust by requiring investment conservatism and diversification.
In May 1990, the American Law Institute adopted the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts Section 227 which would change the law significantly
by its provisions for portfolio theory and flexible risk-return objectives.
In this Article Professor Paul Haskell suggests that some of the invest-
ment liberalization allowed by the third Restatement is not consistent
with the conservative purposes of the family trust.
The prudent person rule for investments by trustees of family trusts has
come under attack in recent years as being out of step with contemporary eco-
nomic learning on investment strategies which would permit greater freedom in
the selection of investments by trustees.1 For the most part the courts and the
legislatures have not taken into account current economic thinking in this area.
There appear to be two explanations for this, in addition to the inertia which
inheres in the legal culture. One is that there has not been a compelling reason
to modify the law because the past four decades have been a period of economic
expansion and rising values. Litigation has been limited, and there has not been
much pressure to legislate change, at least until recently. Another reason is that
contemporary economic theory dealing with investment is difficult for the law-
yer to understand, and when understood is not always convincing.
The thrust of this Article is that the traditional prudent person rule needs
some retuning, but that for family trusts2 it remains essentially a sound rule.
This conclusion is premised upon the ultra-conservative purposes of the typical
family trust, which are to provide a satisfactory income flow, to preserve if possi-
Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B.,
1948, LL.B., 1951, Harvard University.
1. H. BnEs, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (1978); B. LONGSTRETH, MODERN
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 227 (Proposed Final Draft 1990); Bines, Modem Portfolio Theory and Investment Manage-
ment Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1976); Gordon, The Puzzling
Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 52 (1987); Langbein & Posner,
Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; Langbein & Posner,
Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1; Comment, The Diver-
sification of Trust Investments, 38 ALA. L. REV. 123 (1986); Note, The Regulation of Risky Invest-
ments, 83 HARV. L. REv. 603 (1970); Note, Trustee Investment Powers: Imprudent Application of
the Prudent Man Rule, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519 (1975); Note, Prudence in Trust Investment, 8
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 491 (1975).
2. Trusts technically are categorized as private or charitable. Private trusts include pension
trusts and other trusts for commercial purposes, as well as those for relatives (or friends). The trust
for relatives (or friends) is sometimes referred to as a "personal trust." The phrase "family trust" is
used in this Article for the trust for relatives (or friends) because it seems to be more descriptive.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ble the purchasing power of principal, and to minimize loss of value in the event
of severe economic decline. If more flexibility is desired in the form of more
risk-taking in exchange for the potential of greater gain, or in the form of expan-
sive experimentation pursuant to portfolio theory, the dispositive instrument can
provide for it.
Part I of this Article examines the definition and development of the tradi-
tional rule and its application by the courts in recent decades. Part II examines
in lay terms contemporary portfolio theory. Although pension trusts are not the
focus of this Article, Part II also discusses a regulation issued by the Depart-
ment of Labor under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (governing
private pension trusts), which provides for a qualified use of portfolio theory.3
In May 19904 the American Law Institute adopted provisions changing the sec-
tions of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which set forth the traditional pru-
dent person rule, to include among other things the principles of modem
portfolio theory;5 these changes are discussed in Part II. Part III proposes an
adjustment to the traditional rule to bring it up-to-date without compromising
the existing ultra conservative investment standards.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION OF THE PRUDENT PERSON RULE
A. History and Status of the Rule
In 1830 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of
Harvard College v. Amory 6 enunciated the prudent man rule for trustee invest-
ment as follows:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their
own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the perma-
nent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as
well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 7
At issue in Harvard College was the power of the trustee to invest in the
stock of corporations engaged in manufacturing and insurance, which the court
upheld. This position contrasted with the early nineteenth century British posi-
tion which limited trustees to investment in government securities.8 The court's
reasoning is captured by the following statements:
It will not do to reject those stocks as unsafe, which are in the
management of directors whose well or ill directed measures may in-
volve a total loss. Do what you will, the capital is at hazard. If the
3. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1989).
4. A.L.I. REP., July 1990, at 3.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (Proposed Final Draft 1990) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD)].
6. 26 Mass. 454, 9 Pick. 446 (1830).
7. Id. at 469, 9 Pick. at 461.
8. 3 A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227.4 (4th ed. 1988); Harvard Col.
lege, 26 Mass. at 467, 9 Pick. at 459.
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public funds are resorted to, what becomes of the capital when the
credit of the government shall be so much impaired as it was at the
close of the last war?
Investments on mortgage of real estate are not always safe. Its
value fluctuates more, perhaps, than the capital of insurance stock.
Again, the title to real estate, after the most careful investigation,
may be involved, and ultimately fail, and so the capital, which was
originally supposed to be as firm as the earth itself, will be dissolved.9
In 1869 the New York Court of Appeals in the case of King v. Talbot 10
enunciated the standard for trustee investment which was similar in its language
to the standard stated in Harvard College:
[Tihe just and true rule is, that the trustee is bound to employ such
diligence and such prudence in the care and management, as in gen-
eral, prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, em-
ploy in their own like affairs.
This necessarily excludes all speculation, all investments for an
uncertain and doubtful rise in the market, and, of course, everything
that does not take into view the nature and object of the trust, and the
consequences of a mistake in the selection of the investment to be
made.
It, therefore, does not follow, that, because prudent men may, and
often do, conduct their own affairs with the hope of growing rich, and
therein take the hazard of adventures which they deem hopeful, trust-
ees may do the same; the preservation of the fund, and the procure-
ment of a just income therefrom, are primary objects of the creation of
the trust itself, and are to be primarily regarded. 1 '
The New York court concluded, however, that pursuant to these principles,
a trustee is permitted to invest only in government obligations and corporate or
individual debt secured by a mortgage on real estate. The court reasoned:
[W]henever money is held upon a trust of this description, it is not
according to its nature, nor within any just idea of prudence, to place
the principal of the fund in a condition, in which, it is necessarily ex-
posed to the hazard of loss or gain, according to the success or failure
of the enterprise in which it is embarked, and in which, by the very
terms of the investment, the principal is not to be returned at all.
It is not denied, that the employment of the fund, as capital in
trade, would be a clear departure from the duty of trustees. If it can-
not be so employed under the management of a copartnership, I see no
reason for saying that the incorporation of the partners tends, in any
degree, to justify it.
The moment the fund is invested in bank, or insurance, or rail-
road stock, it has left the control of the trustees; its safety and the
hazard, or risk of loss, is no longer dependent upon their skill, care, or
discretion, in its custody or management, and the terms of the invest-
9. Harvard College, 26 Mass. at 468-69, 9 Pick. at 461.
10. 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
11. Id. at 85-86.
1990]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
ment do not contemplate that it will ever be returned to the trustees. 12
The restrictive New York position soon became dominant among the states.
Most states legislated so-called "legal lists," which limited trustee investment to
the enumerated categories of debt instruments. By 1900 only a handful of states
permitted trustee investment in common stocks, unless, of course, the trust in-
strument allowed it. This pattern did not change substantially until the 1940s.1 3
Today only three states have legal lists limited to debt securities, 14 and two
others have legal lists providing for debt securities plus a maximum percentage
of common stocks. 15 The remaining states have the prudent person rule, with
most of the statutes providing specifically for investment in common stocks as
well as other property. 16
Several recent statutes supplement the prudent person principle with lan-
guage that provides that the trustee's investment decisions are to be judged on
the basis of the portfolio as a whole. 17 This language appears to incorporate
modern portfolio theory into the prudent person rule to some degree. The legis-
lation of several states supplements the traditional rule to allow investment in
new ventures,18 options, and futures, 19 all of which have been forbidden as spec-
12. Id. at 88.
13. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United
States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1951).
14. ALA. CONsT. art. IV, § 74 (1901, amended 1939); ALA. CODE § 19-3-120-128 (Supp. 1989);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 15-106 (Supp. 1989).
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2109.371 (Anderson 1990) (60% stocks); W. VA. CODE § 44-6-2
(Supp. 1990) (50% stocks).
16. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.075 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-7302 (1975); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 28-71-105 to -107 (1987 & Supp. 1989); CAL. PROD. CODE § 16040 (West Supp. 1990);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-304 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-88 (West Supp. 1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-8-
2 (Supp. 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 560:7-302, 406-22 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 68-502 (1989); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 1675 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 304-3-3(c) (Bums
1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.123 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5004 (1988); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2127 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. ISA, § 7-302 (1981);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 700.813 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.10 (West 1990);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-13-3 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-114 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
3201 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. § 164-050 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564:18 (1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:20-1, -13 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-302 (1989); N.Y.
EST. PoWERs & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.2 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-2
(1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-05-15 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 161 (West 1971); OR.
REv. STAT. § 128.057 (1989); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7302, 7310 (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 18-4-2, 19-9-12 (1988 & 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 55-5-1 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-3-117 (Supp. 1989); TEx. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 113:056 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-402 (Supp. 1990);
VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.100.020, .023 (1987); Wyo. STAT. § 2-3-
301 (1980). Massachusetts, Missouri and Vermont have the prudent person rule by judicial decision.
Chase v. Pevear, 383 Mass. 350, 362-64, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1365-67 (1981); Vest v. Bialson, 293
S.W.2d 369, 380 (Mo. 1956); St. Germain v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 263, 270, 44 A.2d 137, 141-42 (1945).
Wisconsin has the prudent person rule but certain categories of trustees cannot invest more than
50% in common stocks. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 881.01 (West 1989).
17. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16040(d) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(c) (1974); GA.
CODE ANN. § 53-8-2(c) (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.10 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 35-3-117(b) (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN., § 11.100.020 (1986).
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-71-107 (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.10 (1990); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.100.023 (1986).
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(b) (1974).
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ulative under the prudent person rule.
The first and second Restatements of the Law of Trusts adopted the pru-
dent man rule. Section 227 of the first Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
promulgated in 1935, included the prudent man rule as follows:
In making investments of trust funds the trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary (a) in the absence of provisions in the terms of the trust or
of a statute otherwise providing, to make such investments and only
such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property
having primarily in view the preservation of the estate and the amount
and regularity of the income to be derived .... 20
The comments to the first Restatement in 1935 stated that investment in
conservative common stock was within the prudent person rule, but recognized
that many states by statute restricted trust investments to specified debt securi-
ties.21 The comments to the second Restatement in 1957 noted the trend to the
legislative adoption of the prudent person rule.22 The comments to both Re-
statements expressly prohibit "speculation," such as investment in new and un-
tried enterprises, the purchase of securities on margin, the purchase of property
for resale, and the employment of trust property in a trade or business.23
Both Restatements require that investments be diversified: "Except as
otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary to distribute the risk of loss by a reasonable diversification of invest-
ments, unless under the circumstances it is prudent not to do so."24
Comment e of both Restatements provides in part as follows: "Ordinarily
the trustee should not invest the whole or an unduly large proportion of the trust
property in one type of security or in various types of securities dependent upon
the success of one enterprise or one class of enterprise ... since the effect is to
increase the risk of large losses."'25
The comments state that it may be prudent not to diversify if the trust
estate is very small or to invest very substantially or wholly in government se-
curities in a time of financial crisis and instability.26
The comments also state that diversification is an application of the prudent
person standard. 27 The position of the Restatements reflects the holdings of
many courts. 28 The courts of New York and Pennsylvania, however, have re-
20. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 227 (1935). Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts
§ 227, promulgated in 1957, is identical except for the omission of the word "primarily."
21. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 227 comments 1 & n (1935).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment p (1959).
23. REsrATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 227 comment f (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 227 comment f (1959).
24. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 228 (1935); MREATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228
(1959).
25. RESTATEMENT OF TRuSTS § 228 comment e (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 228 comment e (1959).
26. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 228 comment c (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 228 comment c (1959).
27. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 228 comment c (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 228 comment c (1959).
28. First Alabama Bank v. Spragins, 515 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1987); In re Collins, 72 Cal.
1990]
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versed the emphasis by holding that there is no duty to diversify as such, but
that in certain circumstances prudence may require it.29
Diversification avoids the risk of large loss that follows from the concentra-
tion of investments that are affected by the same economic factor or factors. If
investments are spread among a number of different industries and categories of
securities, which tend to be affected differently by various economic factors,
some of the investments may fall and some may rise, and the portfolio is safer,
i.e., less volatile, as a result. Diversification, the purpose of which was perceived
in a rough way by the common law, has been reduced to a mathematical princi-
ple in modem portfolio theory,30 as discussed in Part II below.
In May 1990 the American Law Institute radically changed the prudent
person rule of section 227 to include the principles of portfolio theory, among
other things.31 The new provisions are also set forth and discussed in Part II.
B. Functional Analysis of the Prudent Person Rule
The prudent person rule is something of a misnomer. Prudent investors
frequently invest a small portion of their capital speculatively. This is forbidden
under the prudent person rule. Comment e of section 227 of the second Restate-
ment succinctly explains why:
In making investments, however, a loss is always possible, since in
any investment there is always some risk. The question of the amount
of risk, however, is a question of degree. No man of intelligence would
make a disposition of property where in view of the price the risk of
loss is out of proportion to the opportunity for gain. Where, however,
the risk is not out of proportion, a man of intelligence may make a
disposition which is speculative in character with a view to increasing
his property instead of merely preserving it. Such a disposition is not a
proper trust investment, because it is not a disposition which makes
the preservation of the fund a primary consideration. 32
The trustee may lend money to the government or to established corporate
borrowers, or to reliable noncorporate borrowers with adequate security.33 The
trustee may invest in equity securities of corporations having a history of posi-
tive performance, with the objective of sharing in the earnings and growth of the
enterprise. 34 Such investments are to be diversified to minimize the risk of sub-
App. 3d 663, 669, 139 Cal. Rptr. 644, 648 (1977); Steiner v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 47 Haw. 548, 562,
393 P.2d 96, 105 (1964); Chase v. Pevear, 383 Mass. 350, 363, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1366 (1981); In re
Trust of Kemske, 305 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Minn. 1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647,
654 (Mo. 1962); Stevens v. National City Bank, 45 Ohio St. 3d 276, 281, 544 N.E.2d 612, 617 (1989);
Jewett v. Capital Natl Bank, 618 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 198 1); Baker Boyer Nat'l Bank v.
Garver, 43 Wash. App. 693, 719 P.2d 583, 588 (1986); In re Mueller's Trust, 28 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 135
N.W.2d 854, 858 (1965).
29. In re Newhoff, 107 Misc. 2d 589, 595, 435 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (1980), aff'd, 107 A.D.2d
417, 486 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1985); Estate of Knipp, 489 Pa. 509, 513, 414 A.2d 1007, 1009 (1980).
30. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTs § 227 (1959).
33. 3 A. Scorr, supra note 8, §§ 227.6 at 443-44, 227.8 at 450.
34. Id. § 227.11, at 472.
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stantial loss. Investment in new enterprises is forbidden.3 5 Buying on margin,3 6
buying options and futures, 37 and buying for the purpose of short-term resale38
are viewed as forms of gambling which use the channels of capital exchange as
the medium, and therefore are forbidden.
The standard of prudence is applied to each investment in isolation. Each
investment is either in compliance or it is not, without regard to its relationship
to other investments in the portfolio. The trustee is liable for loss in value of any
improper investment, without regard to the performance of any other invest-
ment, proper or improper, or to the performance of the portfolio as a whole.3 9
The trustee whose investment strategy is generally successful is liable for the
decline in dollar value of the individual investment that is not in compliance
with the standard of prudence.
The prudent person rule has as its objective the production of income and
preservation of principal. The risk to principal has been perceived as the finan-
cial decline of corporate enterprise. The danger to the preservation of principal
arising from monetary inflation has not been a major consideration in the law.
There is no authority that the trustee has a duty to invest to protect principal
from erosion by inflation.4° It has been recognized that inflationary concerns
are a proper consideration in investment judgments, but that is different from
imposing a duty to invest in a manner that protects against inflation. Undoubt-
edly the practice of trustees to invest a substantial portion of the portfolio in
common stocks is motivated by considerations of inflation as well as growth.4 1
35. First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428 (Ala.), cert denied,
461 U.S. 938 (1983); Hutchings v. Louisville Trust Co., 303 Ky. 147, 151, 197 S.W.2d 83, 85 (1946);
Cornet v. Comet, 269 Mo. 298, 323, 190 S.W. 333, 341 (1916); In re Newhoff, 107 Misc. 2d. 589,
593, 435 N.Y.S.2d 632, 636 (N.Y. Sur. 1980), aff'd, 107 A.D.2d 417, 486 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1985).
36. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 379 (S.D. Tex.
1965); In re Hirsch, 116 A.D. 367, 376, 101 N.Y.S. 893, 899 (1906), aff'd, 188 N.Y. 584, 81 N.E.
1165 (1907); Shaner Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 450 (1961).
37. See H. BINES, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, para. 7.05(1)(c) (1978).
38. See Gee v. Womack, 203 Ky. 718, 263 S.W. 6 (1924); In re White, 321 Pa. Super. 102, 106-
07, 467 A.2d 1148, 1150-51 (1983) rev'd on other grounds, 506 Pa. 218, 484 A.2d 763 (1984); 3 A.
ScoTr, supra note 8, § 227.6, at 444.
39. Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 362-63, 175 N.E. 761, 765 (1931); Vest v. Bialson, 365
Mo. 1103, 1117,293 S.W.2d 369, 379 (1956); In re Bank of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 364 N.Y.S.2d
164, 168, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703 (1974); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRusS AND
TRusrEEs, § 708, at 249 (rev. 2d ed. 1980); 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 8, § 213.1, at 300.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, comment e, provides that there is a fiduciary duty to
invest with a view to the protection of the purchasing power of the trust assets.
41. See 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 8, § 227.11, at 473-74; G.G. BOGERT, supra note 39, § 612, at
18; Hirsch, Inflation and the Law of Trusts, 18 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 601, 625-26 (1983);
Comment, Investment and Management of Trust Funds in an Inflationary Economy, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 1171, 1176-79 (1978). In the case of In re Estate of Carlisle, 53 Misc. 2d 546, 553, 278
N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1018 (1967), the Surrogate's Court expressly recognized the propriety of trustee
investment to preserve the purchasing power of the principal. There is limited authority granting
administrative deviation to permit a trustee to invest in common stock because of inflationary trends,
despite the direction in the trust instrument restricting investment to debt securities. Carlick v.
Keller, 375 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Ky. 1964); In re Trusteeship Under Agreement with Mayo, 259 Minn.
91, 97-101, 105 N.W.2d 900, 904-07 (1960); Davison v. Duke University, 282 N.C. 676, 700-02, 194
S.E.2d 761, 776-77 (1973). But see Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App.
2d 763, 770-77, 310 P.2d 1010, 1015-19 (1957); Troost Avenue Cemetery Co. v. First Natl Bank of
Kansas City, 409 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo. 1966); Toledo Trust Co. v. Toledo Hospital, 174 Ohio St.
124, 127-28, 187 N.E.2d 36, 39 (1962).
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In times of hyperinflation, however, stocks are not likely to fare well because of
the economic uncertainty and instability caused by it.42
The interest paid on debt securities reflects the anticipated course of infla-
tion. Interest of nine percent may be considered six percent projected inflation
and three percent real return. 43 In times of hyperinflation debt securities may be
a better form of inflation protection than common stocks." The problem for the
trustee, however, is that the entire income is payable to the income beneficiary
and is immediately subject to income taxation.
The prudent person rule is wholly inconsistent with contemporary eco-
nomic learning on portfolio management. Under the prudent person rule, any
speculative investment is a breach of trust. Under portfolio theory (discussed in
Part II) risk is not a matter of the volatility of the individual investment, but is a
matter of the risk content of the portfolio viewed in its entirety. Under portfolio
theory a volatile investment which contributes to the diversification of the port-
folio may not increase total portfolio risk. 45 The prudent person rule, in con-
trast, requires diversification, but only among unspeculative investments because
none other is permitted.
Contemporary economic thinking also embraces a passive strategy of broad
investment in the market such as investment in the Standard and Poor's 500
stocks, without adjustment for stocks whose recent performance has not been
favorable.46 This strategy (discussed in Part II) assumes the efficiency of the
pricing of market components and the consequent unlikelihood of doing better
than the market by attempting to identify underpriced stocks by means of costly
research. Such broad investment in the market, of course, provides great diver-
sification. There is substantial empirical support for the proposition that one
cannot do better than the market as a whole over the long term by selecting
stocks. 47 This passive investment strategy would not be permitted under the
prudent person rule because it does not take into account the speculative or
otherwise unsatisfactory nature of individual investments.
C. How Some Courts Recently Have Applied the Prudent Person Rule
Although in recent years there has been little litigation of significance deal-
ing with the prudent person rule, there have been differences in the manner of
application of the rule in several instances. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery
v. Martin 48 represents the traditional method of application. This was a class
action by the beneficiaries of 1,250 individual trusts against the bank as trustee
42. B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 320-21 (5th ed. 1990).
43. See, eg., id. at 314. Since the debt is paid at maturity in a fixed dollar amount, the lowered
purchasing power is taken into account in the fixing of the interest rate.
44. Id. at 94.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 64-77.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 78-81.
47. Elton & Gruber, Lessons of Modern Portfolio Theory 170, 180, appearing as Appendix A in
B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 1; B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 180; Langbein & Posner, Market
Funds and Trust Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 1, 16.
48. 425 So. 2d 415 (Ala.), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
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of two common trust funds, one a bond fund and the other an equity fund, for a
declaration that certain investments were imprudent and to require the restora-
tion to the common trust funds of the losses sustained.
The investments in issue in the bond fund were debentures of six real estate
investment trusts that had been established shortly before their purchase and
were highly leveraged. The trial court found the purchase of these investments
imprudent. The trial court also found the purchase of the common stock of
seventeen "growth" corporations to be imprudent.49 The Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment.
The challenged debentures paid a high rate of interest in exchange for the
inordinate risk involved. This risk-taking clearly violated the prudent person
rule. The testimony of the experts for the parties concerning the appropriateness
of the stock purchases was, of course, conflicting, but the witnesses agreed that
the corporations were "growth" companies that were not well-known and whose
stocks were selling at low price-earnings ratios. The bank's investment purpose
with respect to these stocks was to protect against inflation. The court reiterated
the traditional rule and emphasized the primary duty to preserve the principal of
the trust estate. The court concluded that the stock investments were specula-
tive because they were made for the purpose of capital appreciation and resale
rather than for long-term investment.
The bank had promulgated certain standards of quality for the purchase of
stocks as trustee, not all of which had been followed in these instances. The
court did not use this internal inconsistency as the basis for its conclusion, but
used the traditional criterion of prudence as its rationale.
Chase v. Pevear50 reflects a somewhat more liberal application of the pru-
dent person rule. Beneficiaries of a testamentary trust objected to the accounts
of the trustee for the period from 1968 through 1974, challenging, among other
things, seven investments: Convertible debentures of Continental Mortgage In-
vestors, Evans Products, and W.T. Grant; and common stock of MGIC Invest-
ment Corporation, U.S. Industries, Meredith Corporation, and Penn Central.
Continental was a real estate investment trust; Evans and U.S. Industries had
recently become "conglomerates"; MGIC was a mortgage insurer; Meredith was
a publishing company; W.T. Grant was a retailer; and Penn Central was in real
estate and railroads.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the purchases of all these se-
curities were within the prudent person rule. The beneficiaries challenged sev-
eral of the investments on the grounds that real estate investment trusts,
convertible debentures, new conglomerates, 5 1 and real estate were by their na-
49. These were: American Garden Products, Ames Department Stores, Beverage Canners,
CNA Financial, Elixir Industries, First Mortgage Investors, Hay-a-Tampa, Kinney Services, Loomis
Corporation, Mortgage Associates, Transamerica Corporation, Universal Oil Products, Wynn Oil
Company, Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Cox Broadcasting, Rust Craft Greeting Cards,
and Sealed Power.
50. 383 Mass. 350, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (1981).
51. Real estate investment trusts, convertible debentures, and conglomerates are described in B.
MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 303-04 n.*, 61, 58-65.
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ture speculative. The court responded that real estate investment trusts were
accepted in the investment community as evidenced by the fact that they were
held by many institutional investors including common trust funds. In addition,
Continental was the nation's largest and strongest real estate investment trust.
Convertible debentures also were held by many common trust funds. Evans and
U.S. Industries, although recent entries into the world of conglomerates, were
held by many institutional investors, including common trust funds. Penn Cen-
tral's real estate holdings did not make its stock imprudent, and its stock also
was held by many institutional investors including common trust funds.
There has been a tendency under the prudent person rule to classify certain
types of investments as imprudent per se, such as new enterprises or new types
of investments whose characteristics have not met the test of time.52 The Mas-
sachusetts court expressly took the position that such labelling is unsound. Real
estate investment trusts, conglomerates, convertible debentures, and real estate
are not necessarily speculative; it is a question of the nature of the specific invest-
ment. The court emphasized that the sophisticated investment community had
accepted such investments as suitable.
The court's reliance on the conduct of the investment community seems
questionable. Some institutional investors take risks which family trustees are
not permitted to take. Some common trust funds are aimed at capital apprecia-
tion in accordance with the liberal investment powers of the contributing trusts.
That other persons are doing it does not make a particular investment strategy
proper under the prudent person rule. The court would seem to allow the trust
companies to set the standard of prudence measured by their own common
conduct.
Stark v. United States Trust Company of New York 5 3 represents a novel
approach to the assessment of the prudence of trustee investment. The standard
adopted is the procedural care taken by the trustee in the process of investment
selection rather than the substantive merit of the selection itself. The federal
district court purported to apply New York law.
This was an action by beneficiaries of four inter vivos trusts created in 1965
by one settlor, to recover for losses incurred as a result of imprudent manage-
ment attributable to the retention of shares of the common stock of Clorox,
Evans Products, and Coleco Industries. The trusts held 4,000 shares of Clorox
transferred by the settlor; some of it was sold in 1973, 1974 and 1976, and 1,320
shares remained in the trusts at the time of trial. The stock peaked at 51 dollars
per share in January 1973, declined to 5 in late 1974, and at the time of trial was
at 13. The trusts held 8,000 shares of Evans Products transferred by the settlor;
the shares were sold in January 1975. The stock was priced as high as 23 1/2
dollars per share in February 1972, and was sold at 3. The trusts purchased
8,844 shares of Coleco, at the settlor's urging; none of it had been sold at the
time of trial. In February 1972 it was priced at 57 7/8 dollars per share, and at
the end of 1976 it traded at 5 1/4. The court described the investments as
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, comment k.
53. 445 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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"(young companies embarked on programs of diversification and acquisition."
These were several of the aggressive "conglomerates" of the 1960s and 1970s.
The court described in detail the manner in which the defendant bank man-
aged investments. An investment policy committee evaluated the market envi-
ronment and made general recommendations on portfolio strategy. There was a
stock selection committee which made suggestions on specific stocks to portfolio
managers with respect to purchase, sale or retention. Each trust was managed
by a portfolio manager who made the investment decisions. All of the above
were assisted by a research department which issued reports on industries and
companies. The court concluded that the bank's management of investments
generally, and of these specific stocks in particular, was conducted carefully and
prudently. The decline in the investments in issue took place during a period of
market decline, although the decline in these investments greatly exceeded the
decline in the market. Emphasizing that there is no magic percentage of decline
which mandates sale, the court granted judgment for the defendant bank.
The trust instrument provided that the bank was not to be held liable for
retention of any assets transferred by the settlor to the trust, as were the Clorox
and Evans stock. The court noted that such language did not exculpate the
trustee for reckless or intentional misconduct. The court stated that the bank
had acted prudently and that its decision was not based on the exculpatory
language.
Stark is unusual in its exclusive reliance upon the procedural aspects of the
management of the investments as the basis for satisfying the prudent person
standard. Unquestionably the bank was attentive to its responsibility to keep
abreast of the developments in the market and in these stocks. There is, how-
ever, no discussion of whether it is proper to invest in what the court describes
as "young" companies engaged in programs of "diversification and acquisition."
These are usually high-risk enterprises. The issue of whether such level of risk is
appropriate for a trustee is not discussed in the opinion. It seems clear that a
trustee can conduct its investment strategy carefully while employing the wrong
substantive criteria.54
In the case of In Re Newhoff55 the intermediate appellate court of New
York took the position that procedural prudence is not sufficient. The benefi-
ciaries of several trusts created by the will of a decedent filed objections to the
accounts of the trustees who had invested more than one-half of the assets of
each trust in the shares of four real estate investment trusts, all of which placed
their funds in site development and construction loans. The court emphasized
the high-risk nature of real estate investment trusts engaged in this form of lend-
ig and concluded that the four investments were not within the prudent person
rule. The court cited First Alabama Bank v. Martin56 as a case in which invest-
54. The same view was adopted by the New York Surrogate's Court in In re Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co. of N.Y., 89 Misc. 2d 1088, 396 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1977), in which summaryjudgment was granted for the bank fiduciary based on its careful and thorough procedures in its
selection of investments without any reference to the merits of the investments.
55. 107 A.D.2d 417, 486 N.Y.S.2d 956 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
56. 425 So. 2d 415 (Ala.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
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ments of this nature were held to be imprudent, and distinguished Chase v.
Pevear57 in which the real estate investment trust in question was one of the
nation's strongest whose shares were widely held by institutional investors.
The trustees argued that they obtained information from various sources
concerning the investments before making the purchases. The court responded
that such investigation is only one aspect of the prudent person rule; the trustees
must then proceed to exercise the requisite skill in making the investment. The
court stated that the trustees had as their goal the maximizing of income without
sufficient regard for the magnitude of the risk.
The prominent case of In Re Bank of New York5 reiterates the traditional
position that under the prudent person rule each investment must be justified
independently, but there is language in the opinion which, wittingly or unwit-
tingly, leaves the door open for the application of modem portfolio theory.
The bank as trustee of one of its common trust funds brought a proceeding
for the judicial settlement of its accounts for a four year period. The guardian
ad litem for the principal interests objected to four investments. The surrogate's
court granted the trustee's motion for summary judgment as to the stock of
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., and Mercantile Stores, and denied it as to
Boeing and Parke, Davis. The appellate division modified by granting the
trustee's motion with respect to Boeing and Parke, Davis. The court of appeals
affirmed the determination of the appellate division.
The court stated that each investment is to be judged independently, and
the fact that the portfolio as a whole has increased in value is irrelevant. The
court, however, elaborated as follows:
The record of any individual investment is not to be viewed exclu-
sively, of course, as though it were in its own water-tight compartment,
since to some extent individual investment decisions may properly be
affected by considerations of the performance of the fund as an entity,
as in the instance, for example, of individual security decisions based in
part on considerations of diversification of the fund or of capital trans-
actions to achieve sound tax planning for the fund as a whole. The
focus of the inquiry, however, is nonetheless on the individual security
as such and factors relating to the entire portfolio are to be weighed
only along with others in reviewing the prudence of the particular in-
vestment decisions.5 9
The above language lends itself to the following form of analysis: An in-
vestment is a high-risk stock when viewed in isolation. However, its inclusion in
the portfolio theoretically does not increase total portfolio risk because the
events that affect this stock negatively affect another stock in the portfolio posi-
tively. Indeed, because of the reciprocal relationship, the investment theoreti-
cally may decrease total portfolio risk. It may follow that this stock is a prudent
investment in the circumstances. It is not suggested that this is what the court
57. 383 Mass. 350, 419 N.E.2d 1358 (1981).
58. 35 N.Y.2d 512, 323 N.E.2d 700, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1974).
59. Id. at 517, 323 N.E.2d at 703, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
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actually had in mind, but its language may be used to support this conclusion,
which would be in line with contemporary portfolio theory (discussed in Part
I1).
Two recent cases on diversification illustrate the contrasting positions on
this issue. Baker Boyer National Bank v. Garver 60 represents the prevailing po-
sition requiring diversification unless special circumstances excuse it. The
trustee bank had invested almost all the assets in tax-exempt bonds. Benefi-
ciaries objected to the trustee's account on the ground, among others, that such
investments were a violation of the duty to diversify. The trial court held the
bank liable for failure to diversify and determined damages on the basis of the
loss in value of the portion of the tax-exempt bonds that was excessive, namely
forty percent. The appellate court modified this judgment by determining dam-
ages on the basis of the gain that would have been obtained had the excessive
portion been invested in common stocks. In this instance this measure had the
effect of increasing damages.
In Estate of Knipp,6 1 testamentary trust beneficiaries brought an action to
surcharge the bank executor, who was also the trustee, for failure to diversify
estate assets. The estate included 4,314 shares of Sears Roebuck common stock
owned by the decedent at death. The Sears Roebuck stock constituted seventy-
one percent of the assets of the estate, and ninety-seven percent of the value of
all the stocks in the estate. Four hundred shares of Sears Roebuck were sold
during the first year to cover costs of administration, and the rest was retained.
The stock declined steadily during administration. The will authorized, but did
not direct, the executor and trustee to retain this asset. The trial court denied
the claim for surcharge, and the supreme court affirmed.
The court stated that the authorization to retain did not excuse the executor
from acting prudently with respect to the stock. The court held that Sears Roe-
buck was worthy of investment by a fiduciary, and that there was no duty to
diversify, reasoning as follows:
Although many financial authorities advocate diversity of investment
as a desirable course for trust management, a judicial decision declar-
ing non-diversification to be presumptively imprudent would arbitrar-
ily foreclose executors and trustees from opportunities to retain
beneficial holdings. The preferable approach, therefore, is to deter-
mine on a case by case basis.... Here we cannot say that the record
does not adequately support the determination of the court below that
retention of the Sears stock, without diversification, was not
imprudent.6 2
The position that diversification is not an independent duty is radically inconsis-
tent with contemporary economic theory.
60. 43 Wash. App. 673, 719 P.2d 583 (1986).
61. 489 Pa. 509, 414 A.2d 1007 (1980).
62. Id. at 514, 414 A.2d at 1009.
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II. MODERN PORTFOLIo THEORY
A. An Outline by a Layperson for Laypersons
Contemporary economic thinking on the subject of investments differs
greatly from the prudent person rule. The prudent person rule requires that
every investment be "safe," i.e., not "speculative." Contemporary economic
thinking is concerned with the relationship of the individual investment to the
entire investment portfolio. If contemporary economic theory were adopted as
the legal standard of prudence, the trustee would be in breach only if the portfo-
lio viewed in its entirety contained risk that was imprudent under the
circumstances. 63
All investments have an expected return which varies positively with risk.64
Return means total return, income and principal. The baseline return is short-
term U.S. government debt, which is viewed as riskless and provides the lowest
return. Expected returns on other investments are greater in accordance with
the degree of risk. Risk is the recognized possibility of performance below the
expected return; the greater the potential negative departure from expected re-
turn, the greater the risk. 65 The greater the risk, the greater the expected return
must be in order to justify or compensate for the risk.66
The discussion that follows is concerned with publicly traded common
stocks, although the same rules with appropriate adjustments are considered to
be applicable to the entire range of investments. There are two types of risk for
63. B. LONGSTrETH, supra note 1, at 111; Gordon, supra note I at 93; Langbein & Posner,
Market Funds and Trust Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 27; REsTATEmENT
( HIRD), supra note 5, introduction at 5, comment e at 23.
64. Langbein & Posner, supra note 63, at 7, describes expected return:
The expected return of a security... is constructed simply by multiplying every possible
return by its probability of being the actual return, and then adding up the results of the
multiplication. To illustrate, assume that there is a 50 percent probability that a particular
stock, the price of which today is $10, will be worth $12 one year from now, a 40 percent
probability that it will be worth $15, and a 10 percent probability that it will be worth
nothing. Consequently, there is a 50 percent probability of a $2 return, a 40 percent
probability of a $5 return, and a 10 percent probability of a -$10 return, so the expected
return is $2 (.5 x $2 + .4 x $5 - .1 x $10).
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that no dividends are paid during the course of the year. See
J. LoRm, P. DODD AND M. KIMpTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE, 110-12
(2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter LORiE].
65. Economic theorists define risk as the probable variability or dispersion of future returns,
including those above as well as those below the expected return. The layman, of course, does not
consider the pleasant surprise as a form of risk. See B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 216-19 (discuss.
ing this semantic question).
66. Elton & Gruber, supra note 47, at 170; Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 778 (1985); Modigliani & Pogue, An
Introduction to Risk and Return, 1974 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 69. Langbein & Posner, supra note 63, at
8, illustrates risk:
It follows that there should also be a systematic difference between the expected re-
turns of common stocks that differ in their riskiness. Suppose the expected per-share re-
turns of two stocks (A and B) are the same, $2; but for A the expected return is a
combination of a 50 percent probability of no return and a 50 percent probability of a $4
return, while for B the expected return is a combination of a 50 percent probability of a
-$6 return and a 50 percent probability of a $10 return.., the difference in risk should
make... investors prefer A at the same price, and therefore... B's price will be bid down
below A's.
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investments. One form of risk is that which affects the entire range of securities,
such as general economic conditions. This is referred to as "systematic" or
"market" risk. Almost all stocks are affected by this risk in the same way, albeit
in different degrees. 67 As the market as a whole rises, each stock tends to rise,
some in the same degree, some more, some less; and as the market as a whole
declines, each stock tends to decline, some in the same degree, some more, some
less. Almost all stocks "covary positively" with respect to systematic risk.68
The other form of risk is that which peculiarly affects a particular invest-
ment or industry, as climate affects an agriculturally related investment, as Japa-
nese imports affect the American auto companies, and as the federal budget
affects the aerospace industry. This risk is referred to as "specific," ".unsys-
tematic" or "residual" risk.69 A risk that affects one stock negatively may affect
another stock positively, in which case the stocks are said to "covary negatively"
with respect to that risk; if they are affected in the same way by the same risk,
they "covary positively" with respect to that risk. 70
A fundamental principle of contemporary economic thinking is that the
marketplace compensates the buyer for systematic risk but does not compensate
the buyer for specific risk. 71 Systematic risk is unavoidable; almost all stocks
covary positively, albeit in different degrees, in relation to that risk. Expected
return is the riskless rate (short-term U.S. government debt) plus a rate deter-
mined in accordance with the degree of systematic risk.72
The marketplace does not compensate the buyer for specific (unsystematic)
risk.7 3 This is because the investor can balance the specific risk to one stock
with the purchase of another stock that is affected positively by the same factor
which adversely affects the first stock. In other words, through diversification
specific risk can be virtually eliminated. If the investor can avoid the effect of
specific risk, there is no reason for the marketplace to compensate him for the
risk. The expected return of a stock need not be adjusted upward (i.e., the price
of the stock lowered) to reflect specific risk. The expected return is responsive
therefore only to systematic risk, which is unavoidable. 74
If an investor purchases only one stock, she has an expected return that is
equal to the riskless rate of return plus the rate of return attributable to the
systematic risk of that stock, but the stock also bears its specific risk for which
67. R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 111, 125
(2d ed. 1983); B. MALKIEL., supra note 42, at 229.
68. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 721,
752 (1976); Langbein & Posner, supra note 63, at 9.
69. L BREALEY, supra note 67, at 117, 125; B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 230.
70. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 777; Pozen, Money Managers and Securities Re-
search, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 923, 940 (1976); Note, Prudence in Trust Investment, 8 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 491, 508 (1975).
71. L BREALEY, supra note 67, at 160, 165; B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 232.
72. . Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 172 (1980); Elton & Gruber, supra note 47, at 170; Modigliani & Pogue, supra note 66, at 70.
73. R. BREALEY, supra note 67, at 165; B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 234.
74. LORIE, supra note 64, at 84-85, 136-38; Elton & Gruber, supra note 47, at 171; Gordon &
Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 778; Langbein & Posner, supra note 63, at 9.
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she receives no compensating return.75 The investor has an expected return
which inadequately compensates for the total risk.
An investor holding a substantial portfolio which contains stocks which
covary negatively with respect to specific risks has an expected return which
adequately reflects the systematic risks of each, and the specific risks of each
have substantially cancelled out. The larger the portfolio, the closer the specific
risk factor of the portfolio can approach zero.76 The experts tell us that specific
risk can be reduced to a low level with as few as twenty stocks appropriately
chosen.77
The measurement of systematic risk has been closely quantified. The stock
market as a whole is deemed to have a so-called "beta" of 1.78 All stocks are
given a systematic risk figure relating to that standard. A stock with a beta of 1
rises and falls to the same degree on average as the market as a whole. A stock
with a beta of 1.5 rises and falls fifty percent more than the market as a whole; a
stock with a beta of 2 rises and falls twice as much as the market as a whole; a
stock with a beta of .5 rises and falls fifty percent less than the market as a
whole, and so on.79
Contemporary economic theory supports the position that the investor
should maintain a broad portfolio in order to reduce specific risk to a low level.
An effective method would be to invest in a so-called "index" or "market" fund
which holds the Standard and Poor's 500 stocks, or even broader group of
stocks, which substantially replicates the entire market. This investment strat-
egy reduces specific risk to insignificance, and provides a systematic risk of beta
1. If a lower beta is desired, this broad market investment can be mixed with
short-term U.S. government securities or other safe short-term debt securities.
The riskless investment has the effect of lowering the volatility of the portfolio as
a whole.80 If a higher beta is desired (greater risk in exchange for greater ex-
pected return), this can be done by buying more shares of the market fund with
borrowed money.81
The investor, of course, can establish a portfolio with a beta higher than the
market simply by selecting stocks with an average beta greater than the market,
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at 91.
76. R. BREALEY, supra note 67, at 111-13.
77. J. Cox, supra note 72, at 173; E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 253 (1976); Pozen,
supra note 70, at 923.
78. R. BREALEY, supra note 67, at 126; B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 229.
79. J. Cox, supra note 72, at 174; Elton & Gruber, supra note 47, at 170; Langbein & Posner,
supra note 63, at 10.
80. B. MALKiEL, supra note 42, at 235; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, comment h.
81. Elton & Gruber, supra note 47, at 172; Langbein & Posner, supra note 63, at 12. Increasing
beta by purchasing stocks with borrowed money works as follows: Assume the risk-free rate of
return is 10%, and the stock market rate of return (beta 1) is 15%. The portfolio having a value of
100 is invested in the market, returning 15%. The trustee borrows 50 at 11%, and invests it in the
market. The net return on the borrowed money is 4%, or 2 on the borrowed 50. This provides a
return of 17 on the portfolio of 100. Obviously if the market declines, the loss in this circumstance
would be correspondingly more severe. For further treatment of portfolio theory, see E. ELTON &
M. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1984); A. RUDD
AND H. CLASING, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY: THE PRINCIPLES OF INVESTMENT MANAGE-
MENT (1982); J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 456-69 (7th ed. 1981).
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or he can establish a portfolio with a beta lower than the market by selecting
stocks with an average beta lower than the market. This type of portfolio, how-
ever, compromises the diversification that obtains with the market fund.
It is apparent that contemporary economic thinking allows for the inclusion
of stocks of a speculative nature in a portfolio that is conservatively invested.
The speculative stock by definition has high specific risk, and is likely to have
high systematic risk as well. It is part of a broad portfolio, however, which
cancels the specific risk by diversification and which has a stock beta of 1. The
portfolio also has, let us assume, short-term U.S. government securities which
reduce the portfolio below the level of beta 1. The speculative stock would be a
breach of trust under the prudent person rule.
Most economic theorists conclude that the pricing of publicly traded stocks
is reasonably efficient, i.e., the price of a stock at any time reflects most, if not
all, of the information concerning that stock.8 2 If this is accepted, then there is
no point in trying to do better than the market as a whole by selecting stocks
that are underpriced because there are none, and the cost of research that goes
into the selection process is a waste of money. The only way to increase return
is to increase risk. There is substantial empirical support for the proposition
that institutional investors who are selective with respect to publicly traded
stocks do not do any better than the market as a whole over the long term.83
If the pricing is reasonably efficient, then a passive strategy of investing
broadly in the market without selecting in or out is a prudent and conservative
investment policy.84 This strategy could be implemented by means of a bank
common trust fund or by means of investment in a so-called "market" or "in-
dex" investment fund. This form of investment by a trustee would be questiona-
ble today because the fund would include "speculative" stocks which are
unsuitable for trustee investment. The trust instrument, of course, could author-
ize such an investment strategy.
A cautionary note is warranted at this point. The "laws" of economics are
different from the laws of nature, such as gravity, for example. What happened
yesterday in nature is an excellent predictor of what will happen tomorrow. The
same assurance does not exist with respect to past economic experience. Con-
temporary portfolio theory is all a reflection of the immediate past, and it is
uncertain that the future will be consistent with the immediate past. Certainly
to the extent that some of the theory appears counterintuitive, skepticism is jus-
tified. Concepts such as expected return, specific risk, negative covariance, and
beta level are educated guesses based upon what has gone before and what is
now known. The economic tomorrow may vary from conclusions based on such
information. Indeed there are studies that indicate that beta as a measure of risk
82. LORIE, supra note 64, at 55-77; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at 88-90.
83. B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 169-76, 360; Elton & Gruber, supra note 47, at 180; Gordon
& Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 834; Langbein & Posner, supra note 63, at 16; Wall St. J., April 5,
1990, at C18. For further discussion of efficient markets, see R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE (2d ed. 1984); R. IBBOTSON & G. BRINSON, INVESTMENT MARKETS:
GAINING THE PERFORMANCE ADVANTAGE (1987); W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS (3d ed. 1985).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at 88-90.
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has a degree of unreliability, and that specific risk may play a role in the pricing
of the individual security.8 5
B. Portfolio Theory for Regulated Pension Trusts
This Article is concerned with the family trust. Contemporary portfolio
theory has made no inroads there except in several states which have enacted
legislation which may allow for the inclusion of portfolio theory within the pru-
dent person standard.86 There has been, however, a qualified inclusion of port-
folio theory in the management of pension trusts subject to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.87
The Act provides that the fiduciary shall discharge his duties
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and famil-
iar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a
like character and with like aims; [and] by diversifying the investments
of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so .... 8 8
This differs from the statement of the traditional prudent person rule inasmuch
as it makes no reference to the importance of safety in investment. The Act
prohibits trust provisions which would modify the statutory standard or excul-
pate the fiduciary.8 9
In 1979 the Department of Labor issued a regulation which opened the
door to the application of portfolio theory by pension fiduciaries. It reads in
part as follows:
(b) Investment Duties. (1) With regard to an investment or in-
vestment course of action taken by a fiduciary... the requirements of
... the Act... are satisfied if the fiduciary: (i) Has given appropriate
consideration to those facts and circumstances that, given the scope of
such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know
are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of action
involved, including the role the investment or investment course of ac-
tion plays in... [the] investment portfolio ... and (ii) Has acted
accordingly.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, "appropriate
consideration" shall include, but is not necessarily limited to, (i) A
determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or invest-
ment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio
... to further the purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the
risk of loss and the opportunity for gain... associated with the invest-
ment or investment course of action, and... (ii)(A) The composition
85. B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 242-48, 259.
86. See supra note 17.
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
88. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B)-(C).
89. Id. §§ 1104(a)(1)(D), 1110(a).
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of the portfolio with regard to diversification. 90
The lengthy preamble to the regulation states that the legislative history of
the Act indicates that the common law of trusts need not be followed mechani-
cally. It reads in part as follows:
The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative
riskiness of a specific investment or investment course of action does
not render such investment or investment course of action eitherper se
prudent or per se imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment
decision should not be judged without regard to the role that the pro-
posed investment or investment course of action plays within the over-
all plan portfolio. Thus, although securities issued by a small or new
company may be a riskier investment than securities issued by a "blue
chip" company, the investment in the former company may be entirely
proper under the Act's "prudence" rule.9 1
The significance of this language seems to be diluted, however, by later lan-
guage in the preamble:
The regulation, however, is not intended to suggest either that any
relevant or material attributes of a contemplated investment may prop-
erly be ignored or disregarded, or that a particular plan investment
should be deemed to be prudent solely by reason of the propriety of the
aggregate risk/return characteristics of the plan's portfolio. Rather it
is the Department's view that an investment reasonably designed - as
a part of the portfolio - to further the purposes of the plan, and that is
made upon appropriate consideration of the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances, should not be deemed to be imprudent merely because the
investment, standing alone, would have, for example, a relatively high
degree of risk. The Department also believes that appropriate consid-
eration of an investment to further the purposes of the plan must in-
clude consideration of the characteristics of the investment itself.
Accordingly, ... "appropriate consideration" shall include a determi-
nation by the fiduciary that the particular investment or investment
course of action is reasonably designed... to further the purposes of
the plan, taking into account the risk of loss and the opportunity for
gain . . . associated with the investment or investment course of
action.92
The regulation and the preamble seem to be saying that portfolio theory is
acceptable, but the fiduciary still must pay attention to the individual investment
in a way that is left unclear. It may be that an investment that carries risk
greater than that permitted at common law is alright, but not too much greater.
The preamble also provides that a passive investment strategy of an invest-
ment in "index" funds, or the like, is acceptable provided that there is a process
for filtering out specific companies which are in financial difficulty. 93
90. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b) (1989).
91. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,222 (June 26, 1979).
92. Id. at 37,224.
93. Id.
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The preamble states that comments to the regulation as proposed included
a request that the regulation state whether or not investments such as small or
recently formed companies, precious metals, and objects of art were permissible.
The Department responded that the statutory rule does not necessarily limit the
fiduciary to those investments permitted at common law, but that it would not
be advisable to establish a "legal list."'94
There has been no reported litigation clarifying the status of portfolio the-
ory as it applies to the pension fiduciary. There is dictum in one case, however,
that supports the use of portfolio theory in assessing the performance of the
pension trustee:
When investment advisors make decisions, they do not view individual
investments in isolation. Rather, the goal is to create a diversified
portfolio that balances appropriate levels of risk and return for the in-
vestor. The risk of a given investment is neutralized somewhat when
the investment is combined with others in a diversified portfolio. The
risk inherent in the entire portfolio is less than that of certain assets
within that portfolio. Ideally, after diversification only market risk re-
mains. Likewise, the return from a portfolio over time should be more
stable than that of isolated investments within that portfolio. 95
C. Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 227
Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 227, adopted by the American Law
Institute in May 1990, provides as follows:
§ 227. General Standard of Prudent Investment
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and man-
age the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the
purposes, terms, distribution requirements and other circumstances of
the trust.
(a) This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill and
caution, and is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the
context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment
strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives reason-
ably suitable to the trust.
(b) In making and implementing investment decisions, the trustee has
a duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the cir-
cumstances, it is prudent not to do so.
(c) In addition, the trustee must:
(1) conform to fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty (§ 170) and
impartiality (§ 183);
(2) act with prudence in deciding whether and how to delegate
authority to others (§ 171); and
(3) incur only costs that are reasonable in amount and appropriate
to the investment responsibilities of the trusteeship (§ 188).
94. Id. at 37,224, 37,225.
95. Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 368 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1528 (1989).
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(d) The trustee's duties under this Section are subject to the rule of
§ 228, dealing primarily with contrary investment provisions of a trust
or statute.
96
The introduction, comments and reporter's notes to the section refer to the
standard it establishes as the "prudent investor rule." The prudent investor rule
radically changes the traditional prudent person rule in several respects.
The section explicitly states that the prudence of an investment is not to be
judged in isolation but rather on the basis of its relationship to the portfolio as a
whole. An investment which has high specific risk and is "speculative" under
the prudent person standard may be permissible under the prudent investor
standard if it contributes to diversification of the portfolio and the consequent
reduction of total portfolio risk.97
The traditional prudent person rule requires a conservative, low-risk invest-
ment policy, unless the terms of the trust broaden the trustee's investment pow-
ers. Although it is not made explicit in the text of the new section 227, it is clear
from the comments to it that the prudent investor standard permits the trustee
to adopt an investment strategy that contains more risk than is allowed by the
prudent person standard without express authorization in the trust investment,
if the objectives, liquidity requirements and risk tolerance of the trust make such
a strategy reasonable.98 Indeed, high-risk investment in relatively inefficient
markets such as real estate and new ventures may also be appropriate without
express authorization.99 There is a recognition, however, that something akin to
a presumption of conservatism in investment policy exists even under the pru-
dent investor standard. 100 In sum, the standard of risk and return is a matter of
discretionary judgment for the trustee.
Adequate diversification to minimize specific, uncompensated risk is stated
to be fundamental under the prudent investor standard, although departure
from it may be permissible in special circumstances.' 0 1 The level of suitable
risk, therefore, is generally a function of systematic risk. It seems, however, that
the principles relating to specific and systematic risk may have limited applica-
bility to investments in relatively inefficient markets.
It should be emphasized that the adoption of portfolio theory is a separate
matter from the adoption of a flexible approach to risk-return objectives for
trustees. That is to say, the Restatement could have adopted portfolio theory
without granting the trustee authority to invest at relatively high levels of risk.
At the same time that Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 227 was
adopted, other provisions were adopted including a new section 228 which re-
quires that the trustee conform to the terms of the trust instrument and of
96. RESTATEMENT CTHIRD), supra note 5.
97. Id, comment f.
98. Id., comments e, f, h, 1.
99. Id., comments e, o, p.
100. See id., comment e & reporter's note, comment e.
101. Id., comments f, g, & reporter's notes, comments e, f, g, h.
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course any statute which are not consistent with the prudent investor rule.102
Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 171 also was adopted, which has the
effect of permitting the trustee to delegate the decision-making with respect to
individual investments,' 0 3 although the trustee must personally be involved in
the formulation of the investment strategy and personally must monitor the
agent's performance.10 4 The delegation of investment decisions is not permitted
under existing law unless authorized by the trust instrument or statute.105
III. A PROPOSAL FOR MODEST CHANGE IN THE PRUDENT PERSON RULE
The traditional prudent person rule assesses the risk of each investment in
isolation. Modem portfolio theory assesses risk in terms of the interrelation-
ships among the investments comprising the portfolio. A portfolio may contain
a number of investments which are highly volatile and therefore imprudent
under the traditional rule. The portfolio may be so diversified, however, that a
volatile investment is balanced by one or more investments which are positively
affected by factors which negatively affect the first investment. The cause of risk
for the first investment is neutralized by the negative covariance of the other
investment or investments. As a consequence, under portfolio theory the well-
diversified portfolio may have a low level of risk despite the presence of individu-
ally volatile components.
The risk, or volatility, referred to above is specific, i.e., risk peculiar to the
individual investment. Systematic, or market, risk is not affected by diversifica-
tion and is unavoidable. Almost all stocks are affected by general economic con-
ditions in the same way, albeit in different degrees. 10 6 A well-diversified
portfolio which contains negligible specific risk because of diversification may
have a high systematic risk because many of the stocks have high betas, i.e., high
systematic volatility.
The advocates of portfolio theory maintain that it should be within the pru-
dent person rule to have a well-diversified portfolio which (a) contains individual
stocks having high specific risk and (b) has moderate systematic risk. A diversi-
fied portfolio, which (a) contains individual stocks having high specific risk and
(b) has high systematic risk, may not be within the prudent person rule even
under portfolio theory.10 7
The critics of the traditional prudent person rule emphasize that invest-
ments which are speculative and therefore forbidden under that rule may not, in
certain circumstances, increase total portfolio risk and, indeed, may decrease it,
and therefore should not be illegal. This makes a good deal of sense as applied
to a portfolio of hundreds of stocks such as the Standard and Poor's 500 stocks
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 228.
103. Id. § 171.
104. Id., comment h.
105. P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WiLs, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 253 (1987).
106. B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 229; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, reporter's notes,
general note on comments e through h.
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, comment e.
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or some other comparable portfolio. A family trust could not hold such a port-
folio directly, but it could invest in this manner by purchasing shares of a mutual
fund or bank common trust fund which holds such a portfolio. Such a stock
portfolio combined with a substantial portion of short-term government securi-
ties or other short-term debt of high quality constitutes a conservative and pru-
dent investment strategy. It is sensible to adopt a passive stock investment
strategy of this kind, rather than to attempt to do better than the market by
selection.' 0 8 Current law may make such an investment strategy impermissible
because some of the stocks in the fund in isolation would be imprudent. It
should be made clear, by judicial decision or legislation, that such an investment
strategy is prudent.
The experts tell us that the specific risk of a portfolio can be reduced to a
low level by a strategy of selective diversification among as few as twenty
stocks.' 0 9 It may be possible to establish that twenty specified stocks, if acquired
five years ago, would have demonstrated stability similar to that of the fund
which replicates the market, but that does not establish that those same twenty
stocks will demonstrate the same stability for the next five years. The critics of
the traditional prudent person rule would allow the family trust to invest in
stocks of high specific risk in a diversified portfolio of a relatively small number
of stocks.
It is inadvisable to allow trustees of family trusts to invest in volatile stocks
in a small portfolio. The history of performance notwithstanding, the selection
of stocks for future negative covariance is problematic. Doing this with stocks
with a history of low volatility is what is required under the traditional prudent
person rule. Doing this with stocks of high volatility involves risk to the trust
estate that is inconsistent with the ultra-conservative purposes of the family
trust. Maintenance of the real value of the portfolio and minimization of loss in
the event of severe economic decline are the objectives of the family trust.
Trustees should not be allowed to play fast and loose with high-risk stocks in
portfolios of limited components. In seeking diversification other than in a very
broad manner which replicates the market generally, the trustee should be lim-
ited to investments, whether stocks or other forms, that appear to have low
volatility.110
In the past the trust was usually employed to protect financially the benefi-
ciaries or to assure that the benefit of wealth would inure to successive genera-
tions or individuals, or for both purposes. In recent decades the trust has often
been used primarily for the purpose of minimizing estate taxes, 1 although
even in this circumstance there may be a protective purpose as well. In the
situation where tax considerations are foremost, a more aggressive investment
policy than that dictated by the traditional prudent person rule may be appropri-
108. See id., reporter's notes, general note on comments e through h.
109. R. BREALEY, supra note 67, at 112; B. MALKiEL, supra note 42, 230.
110. The Restatement (Third) states that broad diversification is to be preferred, but that diversi-
fication with a limited number of stocks is permissible. RSTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, com-
ment g & reporter's notes, general notes on comments e through h.
Ill. See id., reporter's notes, comment e.
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ate; such a policy can be and sometimes is provided for in the trust instrument.
Because the settlor can free the trustee from the constraints of the prudent per-
son rule, there is no compelling reason for substantial modification of the rule.
The proposed modification to allow for a passive strategy of investing in a mar-
ket fund does not increase risk; indeed, it probably is safer than the selective
diversification of low-risk stocks. In addition it is likely to produce a greater
return than the selection of stocks.11 2 A case could be made that diversification
by investing in a market fund should be required under the prudent person rule,
but that departure is not proposed. The evidence of the pricing efficiency of the
stock market is not conclusive;' 13 room should be left for selection among stocks
of low volatility. If the settlor wants the trustee to be free to select stocks of high
volatility, he can authorize it and also include a broad exculpatory clause which
is valid short of recklessness.11 4
The preceding discussion has focused on publicly traded securities in which
the markets are reasonably efficient. There is the further question of whether the
family trustee should be permitted to make investments in relatively inefficient
markets such as real estate and new ventures. By definition these forms of in-
vestment have higher than average risk and also pose problems of selective di-
versification. It seems that such forms of investment should require
authorization in the trust instrument.1 1 5
At the present time the economic landscape is a mine field. There are large
perennial federal budget deficits and an enormous federal debt. There are large
perennial trade deficits. There is a huge and growing foreign investment in our
federal debt and in our economy. Our major banks have huge loans of question-
able value to third world countries. Some of our major industries have great
difficulty competing with foreign products. The economic impact of the Euro-
pean Community remains to be seen. Elementary and secondary education in
this country is a disaster area. Many of our older cities have rotting infrastruc-
tures (bridges, sewer lines, water mains, gas lines). The social pathology of our
urban centers worsens. Unless the business cycle is obsolete, a recession is long
overdue. When this nation decides to face up to the reality of its situation, it will
be enormously expensive, with uncertain consequences. I would suggest that
anyone who is daring with another's money in these circumstances is not acting
responsibly.
The prudent investor rule defined in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts sec-
tion 227 allows for higher risk-return objectives than are permitted under the
traditional prudent person rule, without authorization by the trust instrument.
112. B. MALKIEL, supra note 42, at 360.
113. Id. at 188-203; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, reporter's notes, general notes on
comments e through h.
114. Perling v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 250 Ga. 674, 676, 300 S.E.2d 649, 651-52
(1983); Sullivan v. Mosner, 266 Md. 479, 496, 295 A.2d 482, 491 (1972); New England Trust Co. v.
Paine, 320 Mass. 482, 487, 70 N.E.2d 6, 9 (1946); Jarvis v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 478 S.W.2d 266,
274 (Mo. 1972).
115. B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 1, at 121-33 (suggesting such aggressive investment practices).
They are also recognized as permissible in appropriate circumstances by the Restatement (Third).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, comment h.
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Indeed, it would allow aggressive investment strategies such as new ventures
without authorization by the trust instrument. Such practices, of course, would
be permissible only if they were considered suitable and reasonable given the
circumstances of the trust. It is suggested that such fiduciary practices are pecu-
liarly inappropriate in the present economic climate. It is also my position that
such practices should always require authorization in the trust instrument. It is
my view that the Restatement makes a profound contribution by its introduction
of portfolio theory to fiduciary law. The Restatement's break with tradition on
the matter of risk-return objectives for fiduciaries is, in my view, not well-
founded, at least as applied to the family trust.
CONCLUSION
The prudent person rule may make it illegal for a trustee to invest in a
market fund because some of the components may be speculative. This is un-
sound and should be changed. Investing in this manner provides as much diver-
sification as can be practically obtained. It carries low risk, particularly when
combined with short-term debt securities of good quality. It is unlikely that the
trustee is able to outperform such a portfolio by investing on a selective basis at
the same level of risk. The objectives of the typical family trust are to provide a
reasonable income, preserve the purchasing power of capital, and protect against
severe economic decline, all of which are served by such an investment strategy.
The trustee of the family trust should not be permitted to use portfolio
theory to justify selective diversification involving volatile stocks or other invest-
ments in a portfolio of limited components. The offsetting of the volatility of
one investment against the volatility of another is problematic in normal eco-
nomic circumstances; in abnormal economic circumstances it would seem to be
dangerous. Such a practice probably would have as its objective portfolio per-
formance which exceeds that of the market generally, with the concomitant risk,
and should be permitted only if the settlor authorizes it.
The post-World War II period has been one of economic growth and rising
values. Certain economic and social developments, however, make it uncertain
that the future will be as productive for investments as the past. This is not the
time for substantial innovation in the management of the property of others who
are dependent upon such property for their needs.
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